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INTRODUCTION
“SOLVERATING THE PROBLEMATISING” 
FELICITY MELLOR, SARAH R. DAVIES 
AND ALICE R. BELL 
Science and its publics: depending on your perspective, the title of this 
volume could encompass anything from weather forecasting to science
policy studies. The book’s actual focus, however, is the critical analysis of 
science communication. It was inspired by a conference held by the 
Science Communication Group at Imperial College London in the summer
of 2007, which provided an opportunity for researchers from a variety of
backgrounds to come together to discuss issues surrounding the public 
mediation of science. The success of this conference suggested that a 
collection of essays building on its themes would be of interest.  
There is, however, a counter story to this tale of a well-received event. 
Some of the initial reactions to the conference were rather different from 
the enthusiasm later expressed by participants. Our first call for papers for
the conference prompted a brief flurry of hostile emails in response. As we 
discovered, the diversity that makes science communication such an
exciting field to study can also be a cause of conflict. The call for papers 
had noted the need to problematise the term “the public”—especially with
respect to the often-assumed dichotomy between science and the public— 
and had also stressed that this would be an academic, rather than a
practitioner-focussed, conference. The previous summer, we had convened 
a conference drawing on a mix of practitioner and theoretical viewpoints.
It had been an enjoyable event, but we had at times been frustrated by the
difficulty in getting beyond calls for the public to know more about
science. At this second conference, we wanted to draw together, and build 
on, the considerable but dispersed academic research into the interactions
between science and its publics—work which has long since moved
beyond a preoccupation with force-feeding scientific facts to the public.  
Our, no doubt clumsy, attempt to focus on academic work seemed to 
annoy some members of the email list on which we first circulated the call 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
 
2 Introduction 
for papers. Science communication practitioners were quick to note the 
exclusive nature of our language. They objected to what they saw as 
unnecessary academic jargon (words like “problematise” and “dichotomy”)
and felt that our conference was part of a broader attempt to marginalise 
practitioners. As one respondent put it: “Perhaps a bit more practitioner 
focus would lead to more insight into the public, thereby ‘solverating’ the 
problematising?” 
Things quickly calmed down after some mutual clarifications and 
apologies and the conference went ahead as planned, attended by
researchers from a range of disciplines who were able to share their 
perspectives on the science/public nexus. Yet those initial exchanges were 
a sharp reminder of the tension that lies at the heart of the field of science
communication: how should the relationship between theory and practice
be managed? Or, to put it in more soul-searching terms, what is the 
purpose of academic research into science communication?
Dealing with theory and practice 
Science communication is not, of course, the only field to raise
questions about the relation of theory and practice. Other fields focussed 
around a practical or professional activity—education, social work, law, 
media studies—frequently go through periods of reflection about the 
relationship between academic research and professional activities. 
Indeed, the relation of theory to practice has itself, ironically enough, 
generated much heavily-theorised discussion. Yet the relatively recent 
emergence of science communication as a field of academic interest and 
the practically-oriented concerns which prompted its development—in the 
UK at least—mean that any such tensions arise here afresh and, arguably,
in a rather different form. Moreover, as a field tightly linked to the
practical training of postgraduates, science communication academics
confront the practical concerns and agendas of their students at every
lecture. There is no hiding in the ivory tower for us—our students, intent
on pursuing careers in the practice of science communication, would not
allow it.  
In the UK, the centrality of practical concerns to discussions about 
science communication can be traced back to the emergence of the field 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, when interest coalesced around the
public understanding of science (PUS) movement. This movement worked
with the aim of disseminating scientific knowledge to an uninformed
public, and largely drew strength from a scientific community who felt
under attack (Miller 2001). A landmark piece of research arising from 
  
   
  
 
    
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
    
 
 
 
3 “Solverating the Problematising” 
these concerns was the survey into public attitudes towards science carried 
out by John Durant and his colleagues in 1988 and published in the journal
Nature the following year. The results of the survey were widely reported 
by a shocked media which gasped in horror at the “public ignorance of
science” that the survey had apparently revealed (New Scientist 1989).
How many people think the Sun goes around the Earth? Do only a third of
us know that atoms are bigger than electrons?
The supposed ignorance of the public was not a new concern in the
mid-80s, and it is one that continues to be recycled today (see Broks 2006
for an overview of this history). It had been part of the basis for C. P. 
Snow’s (1998 [1959]) iconic Two Cultures speech and is still common
today, as in the leaflets bemoaning the myths of “celebrity science”
published by the group Sense About Science (Tyler 2007). The
preoccupation with public ignorance did, however, appear to reach a peak
in the mid- to late-1980s, and it was in this particular context that the 
discourse now known as PUS was forged. The Durant et al. survey served
to reinforce the PUS movement’s calls for the need to increase public 
knowledge of science through improved media coverage and through more
extensive institutional attempts to communicate science directly to public 
audiences.  
Yet in terms of the academic development of the field, the survey was
more notable for the critiques it attracted than for its findings. Researchers 
working from a “constructivist” perspective—especially those within the 
sociology of science—identified problems with construing science as a 
body of facts or a set of unambiguous methods which the public either did
or did not know independent of context (see Wynne 1995 for an early 
review of such critiques). Surveys of public understanding, it was argued,
like many of the practical initiatives of the PUS movement, were premised
on what is now widely recognised as a “deficit model” in which the 
public’s failure to reproduce researchers’ statements about scientific 
knowledge was interpreted as a deficiency, an undesirable lack on the part 
of the public which needed addressing. Furthermore, PUS often assumed 
that an increased release of information from scientists to the public would 
lead to an increased public understanding of science—something which in
turn was expected to lead to greater public acceptance of science. These 
assumptions did not necessarily hold true. As critics of the deficit model 
pointed out, to know science does not necessarily mean that you love it
(Bucchi and Neresini 2002; Turney 1998).
Traditional PUS took both “science” and “the public” as homogenous
categories, ignoring the varied needs or interests of different constituencies 
within each group. Social researchers, by contrast, insisted on
  
 
  
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
4 Introduction 
deconstructing these terms and noted the ways that definitions of such
terms could be applied rhetorically. Indeed, constructivists set about 
“problematising” (our email correspondents would wince!) all three of the
terms in the phrase “public understanding of science” (Wynne 1991). As
Christopher Dornan (1990) and Stephen Hilgartner (1990) argued, the neat 
black-boxing of non-scientists as “the public” was politically advantageous
to those in the scientific community whose interests lay in reinforcing their 
own authority. Hilgartner, in particular, suggested that by defining the
public as recipients of knowledge, PUS provided the scientific establishment 
with “the epistemic equivalent of the right to print money” (Hilgartner 
1990, 534). These were dimensions which had not been questioned in the
earlier survey work of Durant and his colleagues. 
In the same year that his survey had been published, Durant had been
appointed to the world’s first Chair in the Public Understanding of Science
at Imperial College. Later professorships in the field would be awarded to
scientists who were successful popularisers but who had no research
experience in the area: for instance, Richard Dawkins, the biologist and
popular science author, became Professor of the Public Understanding of
Science at Oxford in 1995; most recently, in 2008, fertility expert and TV 
presenter, Lord Robert Winston, was appointed Professor of Science and 
Society at Imperial College. Such appointments embodied a split within 
universities over the perceived role of academics with respect to public 
science. On the one hand, popularising scientists did their best to assume
ownership of a field whose subject was their own activities. On the other, 
academics from a range of disciplines loosely assembled under the 
umbrella of science studies were best positioned to mount the critical
analyses of science and public which they felt were needed. 
Yet despite this divide between academics involved in practice and 
those involved in analysis, the constructivist critique of the deficit model
did come to influence science communication practice, leading to a 
significant re-formulation of PUS initiatives. When it undertook an 
investigation into the relationship between science and society, the Lords 
Select Committee on Science and Technology appointed John Durant and
the sociologist of science Brian Wynne as special advisors. The title of the 
committee’s report—Science and Society—signalled a significant 
departure from the earlier, and increasingly discredited, label of “Public
Understanding of Science”. This report (House of Lords 2000) has been
widely credited with encouraging a new approach to public science 
activities in the UK by identifying a “new mood for dialogue”. Traditional 
pedagogic and uni-directional modes of communication, such as public
lectures, have given way to a greater emphasis on panel debates and
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
  
 
    
  
  
  
 
 
   
5 “Solverating the Problematising” 
audience interaction; and the PUS movement, with its reliance on a deficit
model of communication, has been replaced with a public engagement
with science and technology (PEST) movement inspired by a contextually-
sensitive dialogue model.  
Problematising PEST 
Or so it might appear. But this narrative of a smooth journey from
deficit to dialogue can be questioned. There has certainly been a
proliferation of new acronyms (accompanied by the odd desire to build the
kinds of manifesto-based movements to which the acronyms refer).
Occasional alternatives to PEST—all with their own unfortunate
abbreviations—have included PUSH (Public Understanding of Science 
History), PUR (Public Understanding of Research), and PANTS (Public
Awareness of New Technologies). Yet none of these movements, PEST
amongst them, is as critically rigorous as its advocates suggest. All can be 
used as cover for a very old-fashioned politics of empire building—be
these the empires of scientific institutions, business, left- or right- wing
politics, individual scientists, science communication professionals, or of
sociologists themselves.  
Even the Lords Report, for all its apparent reach, had its omissions. As
Wynne himself noted, despite being produced from within the UK’s 
political establishment, the report said little about the political nature of 
the science/public interface (Wynne 2001; see also Dickson 2000). 
Questions about the play of power in public science were not addressed,
even though the fundamental insight offered by constructivist analyses of 
public science was that the deficit model was normative. In the
constructivist reading, the PUS movement was just the latest expression of
anxiety from a social elite keen to maintain control within a
technologically-dependent economic system. The assumption that greater 
public understanding of science would lead to greater acceptance of the 
technological products of science was based on a whole set of ideological 
assumptions which failed to question whether science was always an
unambiguous social good (Wynne 2006). Arguably, PEST has much in 
common with the tactics of the New Labour government in its spinning of
public consultation exercises. Just as PUS needs to be located in the 
historical moment in which it emerged and to be understood as, on one 
level, the defensive reaction of scientists who felt under attack from the 
funding cuts of the Thatcher government, so too PEST emerges in a 
distinct historico-political environment. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Introduction 
One might suspect that, at this ideological level, PEST is little more
than a rhetorical disguise for traditional PUS. The switch from PUS to 
PEST came after polarised public debates over GM crops and the safety of
the MMR vaccine. In both cases, public concerns seemed to challenge an
establishment position supported by both government and mainstream 
scientists. In this context, with no clear indication of how PEST activities 
can inform either science policy-making or scientists’ own technical
practice and priorities, PEST comes to seem more like a public relations
exercise aimed at avoiding future confrontations rather than a sincere 
effort to accommodate public concerns (Beder 1999). Wynne (2006),
discussing the move to “public engagement”, describes it as “hitting the 
notes but missing the music”—much-vaunted dialogue activities, he
suggests, remain focussed on gaining public trust in science. Likewise, Jon
Turney (2003)—responding to comments by the Director of the Royal 
Institution, Susan Greenfield, in which she bemoaned the public’s 
ignorance and fear of science—challenged Greenfield’s rhetoric of public 
engagement: “invite them to participate, and really mean it, and they will
find the motivation to become as scientifically literate as you, or rather 
they, please.” The question of whether many PEST practitioners “really
mean it” remains open. Certainly, scholarship which has analysed some of
the new “public participation” processes gives us leave to doubt it (Goven 
2006; Irwin 2001; Schibeci et al. 2006). 
Many of these concerns were exemplified in the “GM Nation” debate
about the future of genetically-modified crops, launched by the UK
government in 2002. In what could have been an important coming-
together of theory and practice, the government’s preparation for GM
Nation had included consulting with a number of UK academics whose 
expertise lay in science and society. Unfortunately, however, the process 
did more to highlight the disjunction between theoretical input and
practical processes than it did to overcome it. Shortly after the debate had 
been publicly announced, the academics involved in the process wrote to 
the Public Debate Steering Board with extensive criticisms of the way the 
debate had been framed and timed (Burgess et al. 2002). The debate was 
to be conducted alongside a scientific review and an economic cost-benefit 
analysis, but while these other two strands were to inform decision-
making, the government stressed that there would be a clear separation
between the “overall dialogue” and the much later decision-making about 
the commercialisation of specific crops (DEFRA 2002). Despite claiming
to want a “genuinely open and balanced discussion”, the government
spoke of using the dialogue to identify which questions the public had 
about the issue and to develop from this “the provision of comprehensive
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
  
 
 
7 “Solverating the Problematising” 
evidence-based information to the public on scientific, economic and other 
aspects of GM” (DEFRA 2002; italics added). For all the talk of two-way 
communication and dialogue, the end-point seemed to be old-fashioned 
top-down PUS.  
A further critique is that PEST, and arguably most of the manifesto-
building around science communication, assumes a policy-based agenda
for science communication. By focusing on policy it provides the science 
communication industries with an apparently democratically sound excuse 
for their existence, but forgets that much science communication is in fact 
consumed for its entertainment value. This is not to suggest that science-
as-entertainment—be it in the form of museums, popular science books,
science fiction films, or any number of other cultural products—is not
political. Indeed, identifying the political discourses in such works is a key
aspect of science communication research and teaching. But many of these
products are not framed around policy endpoints in the way that 
meaningful PEST demands (see, for example, Rowe and Frewer 2005). 
Ironically, by calling for science communication to show non-scientists 
more respect and emphasising the democratic potential of PEST, 
academics have managed to ignore the vast majority of science 
communication activities and the publics who enthusiastically participate
in them (Davies et al. in press).  
It is also all too easy to replace a model of the public as deficient in 
science with one that imagines that what “they” “really need” is a good
dose of history, philosophy or sociology—as Locke (1999) noted in
response to Collins and Pinch’s Golem books. Bucchi (1998) discusses the
way in which—by describing and therefore constructing a meaningful gap
between science and the public—much “dialogue” work actually 
exacerbates and emphasises science/society boundaries. By this reasoning, 
perhaps (and rather pessimistically) the best solution to the problems faced 
by post-PUS science communication is to lie as low  as possible and  
simply let everyone get on with their own business.  
The place of theory 
It seems, then, that the theory/practice relationship in science 
communication remains inevitably interwoven with political concerns and
is laden with pitfalls for the unthinking academic or practitioner. It is this, 
we believe, that makes the theory side of the relationship all the more 
important. As long as governments and other powerful players are 
involved in the public mediation of scientific issues—as they always will 
be in a technological society—questions about science and its publics will
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
8 Introduction 
be inherently political. Actors in these ventures have ideological interests
and motivations that need to be scrutinised by those who are able to 
maintain a critical distance. Practitioners caught up in the pressures of 
actually delivering such initiatives rarely have the luxury of reflecting on
their underlying assumptions, nor the opportunity to speak out in a critical
fashion.
Yet the development of a critical body of theoretical work within
academia has been further complicated, as we suggested earlier, by the 
vocational orientation of most postgraduate teaching in the field. The 
UK’s first science communication degree—launched in 1991 at Imperial
College—aimed to prepare science graduates for careers in the media and 
other sectors of the communications industry. Despite its focus on career
outcomes and communications practice, this masters programme had a 
strong intellectual component (as indeed it still does today), drawing 
heavily on analyses in both science studies and cultural and media studies 
to encourage students to adopt a critical perspective which would inform
their own practice. The Imperial course was followed by several other
postgraduate UK courses, each finding its own balance between theory
and practice. Yet, despite the fruitful exchange between theory and
practice that these postgraduate courses have provided for their students, 
the focus on teaching has, arguably, come at a cost. Teaching programmes
have, on the whole, failed to act as a nucleus for new research groups and
courses have been justified in terms of their practical outcomes rather than 
the synergy between postgraduate teaching and research.  
In the field of science communication, then, theory and practice
constantly come together and pull apart. In different contexts the 
relationship works out in different ways, presenting multiple re-
configurations. Even at its simplest the relationship operates across three, 
rather than the usual two, axes: scientific practice, communication practice 
and scholarship from the humanities and social sciences. But there are 
further fractures: the tension between teaching and research and the
proximity of teaching to professional practice; the many different research
traditions which scholars bring to the subject; and the range of activities 
which constitute practice, from scientists’ own popularising activities 
through institutionally-based liaison work to professional journalism and 
media production. 
We should also remember the diversity of views, approaches and
agendas at work within each of these axes. One of the most noticeable 
developments in recent years has been the increasing interest in science
communication issues amongst historians of science (see, for example,
Secord 2004). Indeed, several academic centres for the history of science,
  
 
 
  
   
  
  
  
 
 
   
 
    
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
   
  
 
  
  
 
   
  
  
 
9 “Solverating the Problematising” 
technology and medicine have recently started up MSc courses in science 
communication. The work coming out of history of science and science
and literature studies (several examples of which are included in this 
volume), and historians’ re-engagement with science communication are
developments which can only be positive. Despite these new unities, 
however, the research field remains scattered, with individuals tending to
face their original disciplines rather than coming together into a coherent
field. Indeed, one might question whether science communication studies 
exists as an academic field at all. Researchers engaged in this area tend to
work as individuals rather than as members of formally-constituted groups 
with a common interest in public science. Despite several journals 
dedicated to the subject, science communication has failed to develop
within universities as an institutionally-recognised academic field rather 
than as a teaching concern or set of outreach activities.  
It is for this reason that we feel—practitioners’ worries about being
marginalised notwithstanding—that there is a continued need for meetings
and publications dedicated to academic research which can serve to draw
researchers in the field together. We hope that this volume contributes to
that effort. A coming-together need not imply an attempt to homogenise 
research, nor to develop a single unifying research agenda, and that is
certainly not our intention here. Indeed, the interdisciplinary nature of the
field is also its strength. It ensures that research is not focussed on just one
aspect of practice, but examines its many manifestations—including mass 
media coverage of science, fictional renderings of scientific issues, the
historical context of public science discourse, the relation of public science
to laboratory practice, educational issues, and much more. Crucially, the 
interdisciplinarity of the field also ensures that analytical insights from a
range of disciplines can inform our understanding of public science.
This volume, then, is not intended as a comprehensive overview of the 
field, nor as a manifesto for one particular approach, but rather as a
celebration of the diversity of the academic field of science communication. 
Our contributors come from a range of disciplinary backgrounds,
including history, literary studies, education, and cultural studies. Some
are based in science communication groups formed around teaching
activities; others are to be found in broader groupings of science studies
scholars or in departments based on traditional disciplinary boundaries.
Several do not especially identify with science communication at all—they 
simply noted a productive overlap of interests. What we all have in
common, however, is an interest in critical analyses of the intersection of
science and its publics. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
   
 
  
 
   
    
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
  
10 Introduction 
Content of the book 
Despite our interest in the public dimension of science, we have chosen 
to start, more or less, in the laboratory. The first chapters take us from
examining scientists’ talk about their publics to looking at their 
interactions with those publics. Davies (chapter one) argues that scientists’ 
talk about the public is an area which has been under-studied by science 
communication researchers. Sociological critics, she suggests, were 
perhaps too quick to ascribe ideological motives to the scientific community.
In the heat of 1990s PUS, this might have been understandable, but
arguably the time has come for a more nuanced understanding, especially
if PEST really does seek to put scientific and public talk together. Previous 
work has often been content to accept homogenised accounts of scientists’ 
talk of the public, assuming without question the power of the deficit 
model. Davies’s analysis draws to the fore the flexibility and diversity of
such talk, pointing to the concurrent presence of multiple models of
publics and to a deep intertwining of the attributes of “science” and “the
public”. Since her findings indicate the presence of at least some “non-
deficit” models of publics within scientific cultures, Davies concludes by
noting that public engagement activities should both hope for, and work 
towards, the increased use of such models by the scientists involved. 
The following two essays start to take up this challenge by discussing
two very different cases of public engagement and the effects they had.
Harris and Thiessen (chapter two) guide us through the fascinating case 
study of post-revolutionary China and its experiments in “total
engagement”. The success of these processes—in terms of a genuine
mixing and use of all relevant knowledge—has been, they suggest, greater
than anything so far observed in a European or US context, despite the
experiments’ brief and inevitably (and terribly) flawed nature. They finish
by observing that as the challenges of, for example, climate change
heighten, those involved in science communication and policy will 
increasingly have to look for guidance from both history and other cultural
contexts.  
In chapter three, Murphy’s case of engagement is rather different. He
examines classroom interactions with science, and in particular the ways
in which young people talk about biomedical issues in classes designed 
around these topics and using specially designed stimuli material. Such
engagements, he suggests, are increasingly important in the context of late
modernity—the “emotive, argumentative, and political” deliberations it
involves are vital for a working-through of prospects and the negotiation
of moralities. Young people’s talk around these issues, he argues, is both
   
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
   
   
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
11 “Solverating the Problematising” 
complex and important—a theme which is picked up by Bell in chapter
four.  
Bell points out that children’s relationships with science are both
under-studied and extremely interesting—children comprise an unusual
form of social group, one which is frequently marginalised politically. 
There is, however, also something universal about the child—we were all
once young, in a way that we were not all once the same gender, race or 
sexuality. The child and science can be, she suggests, a site that focuses 
many of our culture’s concerns and hopes. In elucidating this, she uses the 
case study of Horrible Science (a popular UK-based series of science 
books) to consider a range of ways of imagining children’s relationships
with science. These relationships vary depending on changing (and
sometimes inconsistent) definitions of either children or science, and may 
prioritise the child-public over the scientists just as much as follow “deficit
model” ideas of the scientist knowing best. Yet, overall, Bell finds a lack 
of agency given to the child—at best, they are seen as adults in waiting.
A further site where the child is emphasised is described in Sleigh’s
account of Mark Haddon’s novel, The Curious Incident of the Dog in the 
Night-time (chapter five). Sleigh examines the puzzle of how this book 
came to be interpreted as a story about a child with Asperger’s syndrome 
even though the book itself never once mentioned the condition. Sleigh 
argues that to understand the interpretation of the novel, we must look at
how the text intersected with its cultural context. She argues that the 
debate over the MMR vaccine’s possible links to autism and broader
public anxieties about the nature of childhood, meant that the metaphor of 
Asperger’s syndrome was readily available to the readers of Haddon’s 
novel. By studying the relationship of text and context in a book such as
this, Sleigh suggests, we can cast light on the way that scientific issues 
circulate through our culture. 
Given their frequent construction as “adults in waiting”, a key feature
of discourse about children is how they are positioned with respect to the 
future. Future talk of a rather different sort is the topic of Leach’s analysis
of the promise of a $1000 genome (chapter six). Leach argues for the 
rhetorical significance of hype, not just in popular media texts about 
science but also in the writings of scientists. Hype, she argues, is 
characterised by the conflation of celebratory rhetorics with rhetorics 
which deliberate future actions. She takes as an example the comments 
posted by scientists on the Nature Genetics website in response to a
question asking what they would do if it were possible to sequence a 
human genome for $1000. These responses address multiple audiences, 
including an imagined public worried about the genetic future. Yet despite 
  
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
  
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Introduction 
the provocations of some of the responses, they fail to reference each other
or to draw out any further commentary. For all the opportunities of this 
discursive space, Leach concludes, these rhetorical prognostications have
so far failed to combine into deliberative dialogue. 
One key feature that Leach identifies in the scientists’ rhetoric is that
they talk as if the future were now. Similar rhetoric can also be found in
the case of nanotechnology, as Erickson discusses in chapter seven.
Erickson examines a range of texts—from the formal science discourse of 
journal papers, through textbooks and popular science books, to works of
science fiction. Drawing on Ludwik Fleck’s notion of esoteric thought
communities—small groups with shared knowlege—and exoteric thought
communities whose membership is more extensive and inclusive, he 
argues that expectations of nanotechnology arise from the interplay of
esoteric and exoteric discourses. Far from formal science being separated
from speculative forms of discourse, Erickson shows that there is a two-
way dynamic between science fact and science fiction. These permeable
discursive boundaries give rise to a shared culture of nanotechnology 
across different communities.
Where Erickson’s focus is on the emergence of shared technological
expectations, Mellor focuses on contested technological expectations. The
news media provides an important site in which technological
developments can be debated. Yet in her analysis of the newspaper
coverage of two controversial technologies (genetically-modified crops
and a new generation of nuclear power stations), Mellor finds that
scientists who take a critical stance towards the technologies are under-
reported, as are research findings which might be used to support
arguments against the implementation of these technologies. She suggests 
that the norms of news production lead to the representation of science as 
aligned with a technologically libertarian position. Media reports, she 
stresses, construct science in ideologically loaded ways. 
Contested claims about new technologies revolve around anticipations
of a future which is not yet here. Looking back at the discursive
formations of a now-established technology can help reveal how such
future-oriented anxieties and hopes are played out. This is what Lean
examines in the final chapter. Staying with news media, but reminding us
that news outlets include advertisements as well as journalistic copy, Lean
analyses how representations of computing technology developed over the
three decades following the construction of the first computers in the late
1940s. He finds that computers were imagined in contradictory ways, as
both wondrous and threatening. Even when this image was apparently 
superseded in the early 1980s by a new image of the computer as a user-
  
 
 
  
 
  
   
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
13 “Solverating the Problematising” 
friendly domestic object, the older conceptions persisted. The same hopes
and fears that had been attached to the earliest machines could be found, 
albeit in a new form, projected onto what had now become a consumer
technology. Perhaps, Lean suggests, the representations of a technology
never die, but circulate in new forms as the technology itself develops. 
This book, then, takes us from scientists’ discourse about the public 
through various manifestations of public discourse about science. It shows
how a number of analytical approaches can be brought to bear upon the 
question of science and its publics. We do not wish to fashion this
analytical variety into a single research programme, but if there is a 
common theme that arises from the cases presented here, it is that the 
relationship between science and its publics is a complex one. In the
chapters that follow, we see how science is expressed through, informed
by, engaged with, appropriated, negotiated, and contested by a diversity of
voices in a range of fora. Science is not only a body of knowledge 
constructed by scientists in their research labs, but is a cultural—and often 
political—production, in which different publics participate in different 
ways for different reasons. These complexities are worthy of academic 
attention as well as practical intervention.
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